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DCI BRIEFING FOR  
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WEST GERMAN "OSTPOLITIK"

- I. The Soviet-West German renunciation-of-force treaty, signed in Moscow on August 12, is a major milestone in the determined effort by Bonn Chancellor Willy Brandt to normalize relations with the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe.
  - A. Brandt must make considerably more progress in his Ostpolitik, however, before he will be in a position to submit the treaty to his Bundestag for ratification.
  - B. In the new treaty, Bonn accepts de facto the existing situation in Europe, including the division of Germany, and the German boundaries resulting from World War Two.
  - C. Bonn and Moscow both pledge to avoid any use of force or threat to use force in their relations, and to seek the development of mutual economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations.

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1. Bonn hopes that these measures in the short run will help to allay long-standing fears of German intentions, and thereby enable enough reconciliation with Eastern Europe to bring about more normal relations and the expansion of mutually beneficial contacts.
2. Bonn also hopes that, over the longer term, the growth of such contacts will break down existing barriers between East and West, and foster conditions conducive to a gradual coming together of the divided parts of Germany.

II. Moscow's favorable response to West Germany's Ostpolitik has put at least a tentative end to the harsh tones which have dominated Soviet relations with Bonn for more than 20 years.

A. Moscow's preoccupation with its quarrel with China may well have been a major factor influencing the decision to seek a negotiated settlement of differences with West Germany, thus to securing its political and military flank in Europe.

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B. Moreover, the Soviet-West German treaty in itself represents a considerable political plus for the USSR, realizing at relatively little cost to the Soviets, certain objectives they have been pushing for since the end of the Second World War. They count on the profit side the following points:

1. In Soviet eyes, the treaty grants juridical recognition of the political and territorial gains the USSR has made in Eastern Europe.
2. Specifically, the Soviets have gained a legally binding West German acceptance of the existing borders in Eastern Europe and--implicitly--acceptance of the fact of two German states.
3. The Soviets probably hope that ultimately the atmosphere of detente inherent in Bonn's Ostpolitik can serve to undermine the strategic and political position of the United States in Europe by weakening the concept of Soviet menace which has led Western Europe to accept the necessity of the Atlantic alliance.

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C. The Soviets also hope that the treaty will aid their lagging economy by providing access to the economic and technological resources of West Germany, and by creating a political climate favorable to the granting of the long-term credits which they need.

1. Bonn's Ministers of Economics and Science both led delegations to the Soviet Union in September to take preliminary soundings on possible action in these areas. Further contacts are expected soon.

III. Several obstacles to the treaty's ratification and implementation remain to be overcome.

A. Foremost is Brandt's firm linkage of ratification to the negotiation by the Four Powers of a "satisfactory" agreement on Berlin.

1. To make the Soviets more forthcoming, Bonn has indicated its readiness to reduce West German political activities in West Berlin, but Brandt insists that the Soviets in return must recognize West Berlin's basic political, economic, and financial, and legal ties to West

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Germany, which are essential for the city's survival.

2. Bonn also wants improvements in procedures for West German civilian access to the city and for West Berliners' access to East Berlin and East Germany.
  3. Although the Soviets publicly disclaim any linkage between the outcome of the Berlin talks and ratification of the treaty, privately they concede the connection. They are likely to cite any positive developments in the talks as grounds for speedy ratification.
  4. The prospects for major Soviet concessions in Berlin are not good. Moscow thus far is insisting on a drastic reduction in Federal German political activities, and has offered only limited concessions on movement between East and West Berlin.
- B. Within West Germany, the ratification problem is complicated by the attitude of the opposition Christian Democrats.

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1. The CDU leaders are now less strident in their criticism than they were before the treaty was signed, but they remain highly suspicious of Brandt's policies. The price for their support includes significant improvements for West Berlin, and even an easing of the repressive conditions in East Germany.
2. The government has enough votes to approve the treaty without CDU help, but realizes that it will be better for Germany to have the widest possible support for the major policy decisions embodied in the treaty.
3. The CDU is well aware of its potential leverage. Its forceful criticism early last summer of the government's negotiating principles ultimately stiffened Brandt's negotiators in getting certain improvements. For the moment, the opposition is taking a wait-and-see attitude. Its particular concern for Berlin may well serve to discourage any tendency

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on the part of Brandt to water down the linkage with a Berlin agreement.

C. Furthermore, Brandt's already narrow coalition majority in the Bundestag was reduced to six votes last week by the defection of three conservative-minded members of the Free Democratic Party. This may act to curtail somewhat further his field of maneuver on the Berlin question.

D. The Berlin talks could create a ticklish situation for the Western Allies. They must, of course, insist on genuine improvements in the lot of the beleaguered Berliners, but if the talks bog down over this insistence, an impatient Brandt might accuse the Allies of holding up action on treaty ratification.

IV. The existence of a number of ancillary documents signed with the August 12 treaty has given rise to a bit of interesting by-play. Communist sources have been floating rumors that there is a "secret annex," in which Brandt has given away a good deal more than the text of the treaty would convey.

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A. The intent appears to be to exaggerate the extent of West German concessions, in order to justify Moscow's conclusion of a treaty with a regime it had denounced in the past as a nest of revenge-minded Nazis and militarists.

1. Brandt, for example, is rumored in this secret annex to have renounced any linkage of ratification with a Berlin agreement, and to have undertaken to work for the admission of both Germanies to the United Nations.

2. The rumors could be designed to allay the bitter reaction of Walter Ulbricht, but the supposed agreements are completely at variance with positions to which Brandt is firmly and publicly committed beyond retreat.

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3. We have no evidence that any secret annex exists. Bonn would have little to gain and much to lose in trying to deceive its allies-

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4. The curious factor is that the Communists should feel any need to gild the lily about a treaty which basically gives the Soviet Union such a big plus in Bonn's recognition of the status quo.

B. The ancillary documents include a letter in which Bonn reaffirms Allied rights in regard to Berlin, another letter to the Soviet Government reasserting Bonn's continuing commitment to peaceful means in its pursuit of German reunification, and a so-called "Declaration of Intent"--Bonn's pledge to negotiate agreements similar to the August 12 treaty with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.

1. The Declaration of Intent appears to have been the pretext for the Communist rumors, but as a matter of fact,

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both the treaty and the Declaration of Intent were published in West Germany in mid-August.

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- V. In any event, the West German Government is moving ahead with broader Ostpolitik negotiations as quickly as possible.
- A. A sixth round of talks with the Poles was held the first week in October, and although there are still substantial textual problems, a solution is expected during Foreign Minister Scheel's visit to Warsaw in early November.
- B. Preliminary talks with the Czechs began yesterday in Prague, but formal treaty negotiations are not likely until the Warsaw talks have been concluded.
- C. An effort will also be made to get the East Germans involved in talks in some forum, although another meeting between Brandt and East German Premier Stoph--such as those earlier in 1970 at Erfurt and Kassel--does not appear to be imminent.
1. The East Germans recently began minor harassment of West German traffic to and from Berlin, probably as a reminder to Bonn and its Western Allies that East German interests must be taken into account in the Berlin discussions.

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